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How Evasion Matters: Implications 
from Surfacing Data-Tracking Online
By Janet Vertesi
Princeton University
The past five years have seen the rise and expansion of a new 
infrastructural layer to the Internet. Inspired by the unprecedented 
success of Google Ad-words and Facebook’s “social” data collection 
regime, this middle layer has expanded to include a plethora of 
bots, cookies, trackers, canvases, and other data sniffers intent on 
recording user clicks, likes, and purchases. Contemporary consumers 
do not even need to buy: browsing, searching, or clicking on a quiz 
can all be indicators that a user is looking for new shoes or a winter 
coat, triggering targeted ads. In the world of contemporary Internet 
companies, personal data reigns supreme.
This is not only an online phenomenon. Offline, too, loyalty card 
programs and credit card purchase data translate into targeted mail 
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catalogs and direct-to-consumer marketing programs. Across social 
media companies and third-party data brokers, certain consumers are 
designated high-value targets. For example, according to a Financial 
Times report, information pertaining to prospective new mothers, who 
are likely to be making new and lasting brand choices, can sell for 
much higher prices than everyday users. [1] Attempts to coordinate 
online and offline datasets to better identify such high-value targets 
continue apace, leading personal data gleaned through commercial 
services to exchange hands among brokers for high prices.
I have spent the past three years attempting to evade various 
aspects of this middle-layer of the Internet; first, through studious 
avoidance of Google-related products and services, and most recently 
through concealing the impending arrival of a family member from 
data detection. I undertook this latter practice as an experiment in 
infrastructural inversion [2]: an attempt to make visible the embedded 
nature of this tracking infrastructure in daily life, as well as the values 
and assumptions that such technologies make about everyday users. 
While I have described the experiments elsewhere, [3] resisting these 
data dragnets [4] presented several key findings relevant to the study 
of Internet infrastructures and behaviors online that are important 
for our research community to address.
In this essay, I suggest three implications for our continuing studies 
of life online and offline that arose from practices of data-gathering 
evasion: first, considering the server as an actor in online interactions; 
second, reframing practices of resistance accordingly; and third, 
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a resulting novel framework for personal data privacy policy and 
design.
Where is the server?
Evading data capture required concerted thinking about the web’s 
underlying infrastructure. Because the post-Web-2.0 Internet is 
driven by the collection and sale of personal information, servers are 
incentivized to remember that input indefinitely, and to enable that 
data’s transfer and correlation across various databases. Companies 
work hard to make such server architecture invisible to the user, to 
facilitate an otherwise “seamless” [5] interaction between site users: 
one that appears to be both unmediated and unrecorded. But this 
recording feature is no less important to Internet studies and user 
activity. Despite our willingness to study platforms, [6] algorithms, 
[7] and bots, [8] the server and its economically driven priorities 
remain arguably the most overlooked actors in studies of the web.
Surfacing the role of the server and its long-term memory is an 
important way to understand user interactions online, especially with 
respect to evasion techniques. Because the server is incentivized to 
track, trace, and pass data along for the purposes of advertising, social 
technologies take on a new valence as surveillance technologies. This 
means, on the one hand, that we must reach to a different literature 
to understand and explain interactions that occur in a tracked, 
traceable medium. Thus far, social media researchers have deployed 
interactional sociological principles -- such as Goffman’s concept of 
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“face work” [9]—to analyze interactions online. However, we might 
more productively reach for the vocabulary associated with regimes 
of visibility, tracking, and control, such as the literature on discipline, 
resistance, and system avoidance. [10]
On the other hand, it means that no point-to-point interaction can be 
studied independently of its platform as a contributing factor in users’ 
considerations of what to say—and not say—with respect to traceable 
media. We must therefore revisit the implications of studies that 
purport to analyze how people behave generally through datasets 
acquired online via third-party data sniffing. After all, these 
overheard “conversations” not only occur in a cultural context (i.e. of 
what it means to “do” social media interactions), but also in a context 
wherein individuals self-police their comments. [11] This policing is 
based not only on how they appear to their friends but how they hope 
to appear to the server.
This suggests productive and novel avenues for research. We might 
take a cue from danah boyd’s and boyd and Marwick’s study of 
teenagers’ Facebook use, where teens disguise their messages with 
cryptic prose to communicate only to people “in the know” but out in 
the open. [12] While boyd and Marwick use the example to argue for 
a networked notion of privacy, this technique can also reliably throw 
off culturally illiterate algorithms and stuff servers with irrelevant 
data. Most contemporary systems conceptualize privacy as person-
to-person, with toggles enabling users to decide with whom to share 
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their status or photos. But they do not yet designate with what we 
would like to share this data. 
We might therefore ask: do users want their data to be visible to 
the server? Should this data be archived indefinitely, erased with a 
“sunset period” clause, or encrypted such not even the server and 
its algorithmic data detection bots can read, transfer, or analyze it? 
Currently some of these issues are addressed retrospectively as an 
issue of “the Right to Be Forgotten.” [13] But this might be more 
productively construed as a way in which individuals can manage 
their relationships on the front end not only with each other, but with 
companies and their data servers as well. [14] 
Resistance is Futile?
My attempts to purchase goods undetected purchase infant-related 
goods undetected by data tracking systems, for example by using 
cash or untraceable gift cards, revealed that the personal data 
dragnet is increasingly circumscribed by a network of actors who 
designate traceable consumption as “moral.” This recalls work by 
Tarleton Gillespie on digital rights management. Gillespie describes 
how commercial technologies such as the iPod and iTunes, when 
first introduced, “make us moral” by inscribing users into a network 
of actors that includes Apple, the RIAA, and other agencies, each 
conspiring to make it so that every time the user deploys the iPod to 
purchase music, they do so in a way that is considered to be legitimate 
by those actors. [15] This also evokes early Latourian theory on how 
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the seatbelt or the speed bump function to “make us moral” [16]: 
they inscribe us in a network of technologically-supported social 
assumptions of appropriate behavior, such that to use the technology 
is to participate in that regime, and therefore to be moral. 
Similarly, the technologies of personal data capture interlace 
consumerism, technology, and citizenship.  Under this framework, the 
implications of resistance or “opting out” become more severe. [17] 
Using Tor to evade consumption-based surveillance flags particular 
national security watch-lists; extensive withdrawals of cash from 
various ATMs can flag your debit card for consumer fraud; and signs 
at drugstores warn that excessive transactions involving gift cards 
can be reported to the authorities as potential instances of money 
laundering. Thus, avoiding data capture – like attempting to “de-
script” [32] the seatbelt or the speed bump – can appear antisocial, 
immoral, or criminal. There is no evasion without repercussion.
This presents new questions for Internet researchers. First of all, it 
makes clear that “opting out” is not a true option, as it brings other 
social and even societal-level implications. After all, opting out of a 
system due to concerns about data privacy also implies opting out 
of any related systems, restricting individuals from civic, public, 
or commercial arenas.  Like young urban youth caught once by the 
criminal justice system who attempt to avoid other linked public 
systems like hospitals and schools, [18] this “system avoidance” [19] 
can result in individuals resisting the use of other public infrastructures 
that bring other benefits. This produces a new implication for digital 
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discrimination in addition to issues such as inclusion, exclusion, and 
disproportionate representation in datasets [20] or Internet literacy. 
[21] 
Further, in many cases, it is vital to remain invisible. Much recent 
work has focused on the use of Facebook and Twitter in the context 
of protest, where many users in the field are already focusing their 
efforts on this data dragnet evasion as part of their resistance practices. 
In 2009 in Iran, Kevan Harris found that people tweeted dummy 
locations for protests in order to dupe law enforcement followers, 
opting for face-to-face whispers in crowds to spread the real locations 
for their assemblies. [22] In 2014 in Turkey, Zeynep Tufecki [23] found 
individuals circulating images of text instead of text itself on Twitter, 
under the assumption that the image could not be mined, textually 
analyzed, and aggregated quite so readily. Such resistance practices 
aim to circumvent the server’s propensity for long-term memory or 
algorithmic detection. This brings to the fore the need to consider just 
how this reality of tracking via social/surveillance technologies is 
integrated into users’ practices -- and to avoid assuming that tweets 
or messages recorded on a server represent ground truth. [24] 
Data Balkanization and user privacy
Surfacing the server in my online interactions also produced a new 
way of thinking about where and how a user might strategically place 
their data.  If complete evasion appears immoral and unnecessarily 
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limiting (if not impossible in the long term), then how might these 
insights be applied to new data privacy opportunities?
One possibility is considering not simply the server in the singular, 
but servers in plural. After all, each company has their own hub that 
collects and stores user data. This data may travel from company to 
company, as a recent FTC report on data brokerage revealed, [25] but 
usually only does so along relational lines. [26] The problem for user 
privacy is not simply the fact that data may be transferred “down 
the line” outside of the trusting relationship between consumer and 
their company of choice. The problem lies in the potential for the 
aggregation and co-registration of multiple datasets through third 
party data acquisition. [27] If the power of big data is not in the single 
dataset, but in the ability to combine otherwise unrelated datasets to 
see new things, [28] then we might not fear the threat to privacy from 
the individual server so much as that from connected servers.
Taking networked servers and data transfer relationships seriously 
reveals a potentially new form of practical evasion: one that I call 
data Balkanization. [29] While data privacy scholars have attempted 
to evade collection in the first place or to confuse algorithms, [30] 
this approach to data privacy attempts to evade the repercussions 
of data combination by spreading traces across multiple servers that 
are disconnected from each other due to the status of the companies’ 
relational ties.  If the power of big data and ubiquitous computing lies 
in the combinability of datasets and the seamlessness of interactions, 
/ 9 How evasion matters /Vertesi/ Summer 2015
then obscurity lies in severing those ties and cherishing the seams. 
[31]
There are many such seams to be exploited. One involves the answer 
to the question: do the companies involved have a relationship with 
each other? In my own efforts to evade Google, I have resorted to 
using services such as Apple, Yahoo!, Bing, AIM, and Facebook. I 
know full well that these systems trace me on an individual basis. 
However, at present AOL and Microsoft, Apple and Google, Facebook 
and Yahoo! have limited, even hostile relationships with each other 
and are unlikely to share personal user data with their competition. 
Spreading traces across multiple servers whose owners do not nurture 
relational ties can increase user confidence at producing a kind of 
composite privacy through evading aggregation across platforms.
Data Balkanization flies in the face of contemporary systems’ emphasis 
on convergence and ubiquitous computing. One-stop shops such as 
universal logins or the multiple services offer customer convenience, 
to be sure. And other points of convergence including the mobile phone 
or internet cookies provide cross-platform integration that make for a 
wondrous user experience. But they do so at the user’s expense when 
they involve connecting otherwise disconnected datasets, threatening 
personal identification. Ultimately, a Balkanized approach to data 
privacy that spreads personal user data across multiple unrelated 
systems and relies upon the servers’ disconnection to produce a 
modicum of user de-identification, may provide a way of de-scripting 
the network that does not imply overwhelming civil repercussions.
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Future Thoughts
It is certainly true that for many people, evasion is the only option 
for protecting their privacy—and in some cases, their civil liberties 
as well. But evasion can also be a useful analytical tool in the service 
of infrastructural inversion. In this case, it revealed an otherwise 
invisible network of servers engaged in data storage and transfer 
that underlie the era of personalization algorithms. It exposed how 
those servers and the companies they represent entrap users in a 
web of technology and consumer activity that makes the collection 
of personal data through consumption “moral,” while rendering 
attempts to evade detection criminally suspect. It also demonstrates 
how Internet researchers must take seriously how economically 
incentivized server activities are inserted into computer-mediated 
communication, and examine the repercussions for resistance. 
Finally, it presents strategies for user privacy not through evasion, 
but deploying knowledge of the network of servers to strategically 
place personal information in non-centralizeable or non-combinable 
locations. Each of these insights presents opportunities for further 
analysis, policy work, and design.
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